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NOTES
GOING PUBLIC WITH DISCRIMINATING
PRIVATE CLUBS
The private club has been recently besieged with complaints and
challenges attacking its very nature-exclusivity. Despite such
challenges, the United States Supreme Court has frequently ex-
pressed the notion that there is a right to discriminate.' This right,
however, is qualified, and has not been accorded affirmative consti-
tutional protection.2 The purpose of this Note is to analyze post-
Moose Lodge case law and theories to determine when exclusion,
despite abridgement of associational rights, becomes illegal discrim-
ination. In addition, new theories and laws will be proposed to deal
with discrimination by private clubs.
I. Recent Court Decisions
There are two major categories of court cases concerning private
clubs-those dealing with racial discrimination and those concern-
ing sex discrimination. The theories and laws for evaluating and
remedying racial discrimination are broader, more numerous, and
1. See, e.g., Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 573-74
(1974); Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 463 (1973); Moose Lodge No.
107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 179-80 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Bell v.
Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 313 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
2. Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 469-70 (1973). The Court suc-
cinctly stated that "[sluch private bias is not barred by the Constitution,
nor does it invoke any sanction of laws, but neither can it call on the
Constitution for material aid from the State." Id. at 469. The cases which
have recognized a fundamental right of association have concerned organi-
zations whose primary function was to express a political ideology. See,
e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S.
449 (1958); National Socialist White People's Party v. Ringers, 473 F.2d
1010 (4th Cir. 1973). In other cases, the right has been accorded less exten-
sive protection and has even been abridged where the organization's activi-
ties are considered unimportant or unworthy of protection by the court.
See, e.g., Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63 (1928). This suggests that
associational rights may be abridged in favor of pursuing equality where
the associational claims do not embrace highly prized forms of association,
such as banding together for the furtherance of political or religious goals.
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hence more effective than those for sex discrimination.' The Civil
Rights Act of 1964, prohibiting racial discrimination in places of
public accommodation involved in interstate commerce, as well as
the state action doctrine under the equal protection clause-
sometimes turning private clubs into "public" ones-is responsible
for the greater success in remedying racial discrimination.
Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis4 involved a black guest at a local
chapter of the Moose Lodge, a national fraternal organization, who
was refused service at the club's dining and bar facilities. This was
allegedly because the club's constitution and bylaws restricted
membership to caucasians. Irvis argued that the discrimination vio-
lated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
"State action" was alleged by reason of the Pennsylvania liquor
board's issuance to appellant of a private club liquor license. In
response to the district court's finding of illegal discrimination in
membership and guest policies, the club amended its bylaws to
forbid blacks as guests. The United States Supreme Court reversed
the district court on the grounds that a guest had no standing to sue
on the question of membership5 and that the state was not suffi-
ciently implicated in the discriminatory guest practices so as to
make such practices state action.' The Court did concede, however,
that the state would be enjoined from enforcing its Liquor Control
Board regulation requiring club licensees to comply with club by-
laws because as applied to Moose Lodge, that regulation, although
neutral in its terms, required state sanctions to enforce a discrimi-
natory private rule.7
The club's legal victory was short-lived. A scant six weeks after
the decision was handed down, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
held the Moose Lodge dining room and bar, open to the general
3. See, e.g., Wahba v. New York Univ., 492 F.2d 96, 100 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 874 (1974); New York City Jaycees, Inc. v. United
States Jaycees, Inc., 377 F. Supp. 481, 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-2000h-6 (1970), as amended, §§ 2000c-e,
2000h (Supp. II, 1972).
4. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
5. Id. at 166.
6. Id. at 177.
7. Id. at 178-79. For an extended discussion of the case, see 41 FORDHAM
L. REV. 695 (1973).
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caucasian public when accompanied by a member, to be places of
"public accommodation." Racial discrimination in such places was
expressly prohibited by state law.'
The Moose Lodge decisions focus attention upon a problem inher-
ent in discrimination cases, namely, the definition and determina-
tion of what qualifies as a "private club." Justice Rehnquist stated
that "Moose Lodge is a private club in the ordinary meaning of that
term."' On the same facts, however, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court found that Moose Lodge was a "place of public accommoda-
tion.""° The "ordinary meaning of that term" remains unclear, as
other cases and legal commentators indicate." Nevertheless, courts
have developed tests to distinguish "public" from "private" clubs.
In Nesmith v. YMCA of Raleigh, 2 an early private club discrimi-
nation case, a black minister sought and was denied admission to
the YMCA on the grounds that he was "insincere." He sought
injunctive relief against the discriminatory policies in a class ac-
tion. The court held that the large size of the organization, the loose
membership requirements, and the lack of general participation by
members in meetings indicated the organization's "public" status.
To justify racial discrimination in Daniel v. Paul,3 an amusement
park claimed "private club" status because patrons were required
to pay a twenty-five cent "membership" fee. The Supreme Court
denounced the fee as a mere subterfuge designed to circumvent the
provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964." 4 The Court held that a
nonbusiness character, control by members of finances and gover-
8. Commonwealth Human Relations Comm'n v. Moose Lodge No. 107,
448 Pa. 451, 294 A.2d 594, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1052 (1972). The
Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 951-63
(1964), as amended, (Supp. 1974), guarantees the right to freedom
from discrimination "because of race, color, religious creed, ancestry, age,
sex or national origin" in any place of public accommodation.
9. 407 U.S. at 171.
10. 448 Pa. at 458-59, 294 A.2d at 597-98.
11. See generally Note, "Is It in Fact a Private Club?," 2 N.C. CENT.
U.L.J. 157 (1970); Note, Constitutional Law-Private Club Discrimi-
nation, 1970 Wis. L. REV. 595; 23 CATHOLIC U.L. REV. 147 (1973).
12. 397 F.2d 96 (4th Cir. 1968).
13. 395 U.S. 298 (1969).
14. Id. at 301-02.
1975]
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
nance, and actual selectivity in admissions policies were prerequis-
ites of private club status. 5
In Moose Lodge on the other hand, the Supreme Court decided
that private funding, restricting membership and guest privileges,
and conducting all activities in a club-owned building made Moose
Lodge a private club. 6 The Court did not consider whether the
Lodge's role as a center of community activity meant it was in fact
open to the public. More recently, in Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven
Recreation Association,7 the Supreme Court recoiled at the notion
that a swim club, by deeming itself private, may restrict member-
ship to white residents of a particular geographic area, when pur-
chase of property from a member automatically conferred waiting
list preference to purchasers. Similarly, the Second Circuit has re-
jected number limitations as a criterion of selectivity, stating that
''every restaurant or night club limited by law or fire regulations to
a given number of occupants at a given time would be magically
transformed into a 'private club.' "'"
Private club status has also been denied where a club enters into
an arrangement with local motels whereby the manager of the club
allows the motels' customers to use the club facilities as his
"guests.' State courts have held that organizations cannot be clas-
sified as private where they open their doors, albeit for a limited
purpose or time, to the general public.20 When their doors are thus
15. Id. at 301. See also Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S.
229 (1969); Kyles v. Paul, 263 F. Supp. 412 (E.D. Ark. 1967).
16. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in the subsequent decision in
Commonwealth Human Relations Comm'n v. Moose Lodge No. 107, 448
Pa. 451, 459-60, 294 A.2d 594, 598 (1972), stated that the Human Relations
Act exempted from its requirements only those fraternal organizations
which were "distinctly private." By opening its facilities to nonmembers,
Moose Lodge lost its "distinctly private" character.
17. 410 U.S. 431 (1973).
18. Olzman v. Lake Hills Swim Club, Inc., 495 F.2d 1333, 1336 (2d Cir.
1974).
19. Anderson v. Pass Christian Isles Golf Club, Inc., 488 F.2d 855 (5th
Cir. 1974).
20. See, e.g., Batavia Lodge No. 196 v. New York Div. of Human
Rights, 35 N.Y.2d 143, 316 N.E.2d 318, 359 N.Y.S.2d 25 (1974) (where club
invited blacks to fashion show on its premises and refused to serve them
at bar); Commonwealth Human Relations Comm'n v. Moose Lodge No.
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open and they derive the bulk of their funds from sources other than
their members, their private club status, for tax purposes, is termi-
nated."
In Solomon v. Miami Woman's Club,"2 a nonprofit organization,
although engaging in civic affairs, sold neither food nor alcoholic
beverages, kept rigid admission standards, owned its own land and
clubhouse, and operated its facilities solely for the benefit and use
of its members. The court found that while the club had never
admitted a black woman, it was not formed for the primary purpose
of excluding blacks on account of their race. Based on the facts and
the Nesmith, Moose Lodge, and Tillman tests, the club was deemed
"private."
Emerging from the case law, therefore, is a test which scrutinizes
the club's membership process, its general character (size, purpose
for existence, types of activities), the use of its facilities by non-
members, the participation of its members in governing the club,
and the source of its income.
II. Remedies
A. Equal Protection and State Action Theories
State action must be found in order to invoke the equal protection
clause when a club is otherwise deemed to be "private."" While
there is no clear-cut test for detecting state action, 4 there are three
basic "state action" theories which have emerged from the volumi-
nous case law: "public function," "minimal state involvement,"
and "significant state involvement.""5
107, 448 Pa. 451, 294 A.2d 594, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1052 (1972)
(where the court held that allowing public to enter dining room and bar
when accompanied by member made facilities "places of public accommo-
dation").
21. See Polish American Club v. Commissioner, CCH TAX CT. REP.
Dec. No. 32,718(M) (Aug. 6, 1974).
22. 359 F. Supp. 41 (S.D. Fla. 1973).
23. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
24. Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 574 (1974); Reitman
v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 378 (1967); Nesmith v. YMCA, 397 F.2d 96, 101
(5th Cir. 1968).
25. For a complete examination of state action, see Hemphill, State
Action and Civil Rights, 23 MERCER L. REV. 519 (1972). See also Note,
1975]
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The first of these, the public function doctrine, holds that a pri-
vate entity exercising "powers or functions governmental in nature"
must conform to the requirements of the fourteenth amendment."
No actual involvement by the government in the activity is neces-
sary. Since private clubs are most often organized to promote the
social interests of their members and do not engage in activities
typically carried on by governments, the public function theory is
generally not useful in examining them. In New York City Jaycees,
Inc. v. United States Jaycees, Inc.," however, the public function
theory was relied on to bolster a finding of unconstitutional discrim-
ination. There, the "local" chapter of the national organization, in
contravention to the national bylaws, began admitting women to
membership. When the national organization took preliminary
steps to revoke the local's charter, the local sued to enjoin the revo-
cation. The court held that the Jaycees had changed from a social
to a civic organization whose "good deeds are the kinds of activity
generally thought of as public functions." 8 Since the funding for
these activities was largely governmental, the court found that state
action was present and enjoined the revocation of the charter.29
Developing Legal Vistas for the Discouragement of Private Club
Discrimination, 58 IOWA L. REV. 108, 112-15 (1972).
26. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966). The public function
theory may prove useful where tax exemptions have been granted. In
Jackson v. Statler Foundation, 496 F.2d 623, 634 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
95 S. Ct. 1124 (1974), the Second Circuit stated that the legislative history
of the Internal Revenue Code's charitable exemption and deduction may
raise the presumption that foundation activities are public functions. It
may, however, prove difficult to achieve any extension of this idea to
private clubs. The court in Jackson detailed the public attributes of pri-
vate foundations, id. at 627 n.6, and such public attributes may be lacking
in many private clubs.
27. 377 F. Supp. 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). For similar cases attacking the
Jaycees, see Junior Chamber of Commerce of Rochester, Inc. v. United
States Jaycees, 495 F.2d 883 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 505 (1974).
28. 377 F. Supp. at 489.
29. Id. But cf. Solomon v. Miami Woman's Club, 359 F. Supp. 41 (S.D.
Fla. 1973), where the court refused to find state action although the organi-
zation performed community services. The same court, shortly after
Solomon, did allude to the public function theory in Golden v. Biscayne
Bay Yacht Club, 370 F. Supp. 1038 (S.D. Fla. 1973). Here, the City of
[Vol. III
NOTES
The minimal state involvement theory,30 in contrast to the public
function theory, does not directly curtail the practice of the discrim-
inatory activity, but instead ends the governmental involvement in
order to discourage the discriminatory action. Requisite to use of the
theory is that the government actually has involved itself at some
point, albeit insignificantly, with the activity in issue. Applied to
private clubs, minimal involvement can be found in state tax bene-
fits and grants of liquor and food licenses."' Despite some conceptual
potency, "minimal involvement" in practice is ineffective. The
courts refuse to apply the concept because of the pervasive influence
of government in virtually all private activity.3" Furthermore, where
protection of first amendment rights of association is involved, the
courts are even more reluctant to find state action.3 Fear of a chill-
ing effect upon associational and privacy rights has led the courts
Miami leased land to the club and waived use restrictions in order to
alleviate the shortage of public dock facilities. The court found that since
Miami prohibited its lessees from discrimination on leased premises and
the club was enjoying a special privilege, it could not discriminate against
blacks and Jews.
30. The theory was first discussed in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1
(1948), where it was held that court enforcement of a restrictive covenant
amounted to impermissible state action under the fourteenth amendment.
31. In theory the granting of a liquor license constituted minimal state
involvement in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972); the test,
however, is disfavored and was not applied in that case by the Court. The
granting of tax benefits was held to constitute state action in Falkenstein
v. Department of Revenue, 350 F. Supp. 887 (D. Ore.), appeal dismissed,
409 U.S. 1099 (1972). Falkenstein specifically distinguished tax exemp-
tions from liquor licenses. 350 F. Supp. at 888-89.
32. The cases uniformly hold that state action requires a significant
degree of state involvement, as where a symbiotic partnership exists be-
tween the state and the private entity or where there is joint participation
by the two. See Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 568-69
(1974); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 173 (1972); Reitman
v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 380 (1967); Weigand v. Afton View Apts., 473 F.
2d 545, 547-48 (8th Cir. 1973); Greco v. Orange Memorial Hosp. Corp., 374
F. Supp. 227, 232 (E.D. Tex. 1974); Ellingson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 363
F. Supp. 1344, 1347 (S.D.S.D. 1973). See generally Note, State Action:
Theories for Applying Constitutional Restrictions to Private Activity, 74
COLUM. L. REV. 656, 660, 672-73 (1974).
33. See note 2 sup'a and accompanying text.
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consistently to hold that mere regulation is not sufficient to consti-
tute state action. 34
Due to judicial disfavor of the minimal involvement theory,
courts have developed the theory of "significant state involve-
ment. ' 35 It differs from the minimal involvement analysis primarily
in degree. Boundaries of the test are still in flux, changing on a case-
by-case basis, because courts have stated that the requisite involve-
ment under the test can be found only "by sifting facts and weighing
circumstances."3 Nevertheless, several common tests have evolved
from the cases for finding "state action" under this theory. They
include counting the state contacts with the private entity3 and
examining the state-conferred benefits that tend to encourage dis-
crimination.38 Thus, in a recent case,39 the court found that the
municipality, by waiving land use restrictions for a club, was confer-
34. See, e.g., Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm.,
412 U.S. 94 (1973); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972);
Northrip v. Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, 372 F. Supp. 594, 597 (E.D.
Mich. 1974).
35. Note, Developing Legal Vistas For the Discouragement of Private
Club Discrimination, 58 IOWA L. REv. 108, 113 (1972).
36. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
37. Id. at 723-24. A contracts case, Stearns v. Veterans of Foreign Wars,
353 F. Supp. 473 (D.D.C. 1972), involved a female veteran who served
actively during World War II and sought membership in the defendant
organization. The VFW, chartered by Congress, had a rule against admit-
ting females as members. The court held that Congress did not intend to
limit membership to males and that absent any discriminatory language
in the charter itself, no significant state involvement in the discriminatory
conduct could be said to exist. Id. at 476. See also Kansas City Junior
Chamber of Commerce v. Missouri State Junior Chamber of Commerce,
summarized at 43 U.S.L.W. 2306 (8th Cir. Jan. 28, 1975) where the court
found that governmental funding of specific programs of an organization
which admits only males is not a sufficient nexus with the organization to
constitute governmental action in the organization's discriminatory ac-
tions.
38. See, e.g., Junior Chamber of Commerce of Kansas City v. Missouri
State Junior Chamber of Commerce, 508 F.2d 1031 (8th Cir. 1975); Golden
v. Biscayne Bay Yacht Club, 370 F. Supp. 1038 (S.D. Fla. 1973); Falken-
stein v. Department of Revenue, 350 F. Supp. 887 (D. Ore. 1972), appeal
dismissed, 409 U.S. 1099 (1973).
39. Golden v. Biscayne Bay Yacht Club, 370 F. Supp. 1038 (S.D. Fla.
1973).
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ring a benefit on that club. Another case held that tax exemptions
for private fraternal organizations confer a benefit on the organiza-
tion and involve the state in the discriminatory practice."
Aside from the difference in degree between the two tests, there
is a difference in the remedy they trigger. As previously noted, mini-
mal involvement has been only marginally effective.' When the
doctrine has been applied, courts use it only to remove the govern-
mental action.2 Its usefulness extends to discouraging the discrimi-
natory practice rather than terminating it. Significant state action,
on the other hand, has been used both to remove governmental
support and to prohibit directly the discriminatory activity. Thus,
the latter theory is a much more useful tool to prevent discrimina-
tion.
B. The Commerce Clause
The other traditional means to prohibit discrimination is the
commerce clause. The invocation of Congress' commerce clause
power requires that the object of congressional legislation be related,
at least tangentially, to the movement of goods in interstate com-
merce or to operations affecting such commerce.44 This connection
is generally difficult to find in truly private club cases where the
club serves no food and its facilities are not open to the general
public.4" Thus the Civil Rights Act of 196446 applies only when a club
is found to be a place of public accommodation,47 since the move-
40. Falkenstein v. Department of Revenue, 350 F. Supp. 887 (D. Ore.
1972), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1099 (1973).
41. See notes 30-32 supra and text accompanying notes 30-34 supra.
42. See, e.g., Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963); Burton v.
Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
43. See, e.g., New York City Jaycees, Inc. v. United States Jaycees,
Inc., 377 F. Supp. 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Golden v. Biscayne Bay Yacht
Club, 370 F. Supp. 1038 (S.D. Fla. 1973); Bennett v. Dyer's Chop House,
Inc., 350 F. Supp. 153 (N.D. Ohio 1972) (involving a public restaurant
which discriminated against women).
44. B. SCHWARTZ, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 103-08 (1972).
45. See, e.g., Solomon v. Miami Woman's Club, 359 F. Supp. 41 (S.D.
Fla. 1973).
46. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-2000h-6 (1970), as amended, §§ 2000c-e, 2000h
(Supp. II, 1972).
47. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S.
241 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
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ment of goods and of interstate travellers may have been curtailed
by the discrimination." When the impact of the discrimination is
the discouragement of interstate commerce, Congress may legislate
to forbid the interference.49
C. Federal Civil Rights Acts
The modern methods for dealing with racially discriminatory con-
duct in the context of private clubs are in the legislative sphere. The
Civil Rights Act" has proved of immeasurable help in eliminating
discrimination, especially since no state action is required to invoke
it.51
A recent major case brought under sections 1981 (right to sue and
contract), 1982 (right to buy property), and 2000a (public accommo-
dations)5" is Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Association.5 3 In
48. For a discussion of how the commerce clause has been successfully
invoked, see discussion of Olzman v. Lake Hills Swim Club, Inc., 495 F.2d
1333 (2d Cir. 1974), in text accompanying notes 60-67 infra.
49. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 257-58
(1964).
50. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-2000h-6 (1970), as amended, §§ 2000c-e, 2000h
(Supp. II, 1972).
51. Jones v. Mayer, 392 U.S. 409, 417 (1968); Gonzales v. Fairfax-
Brewster School, Inc., 363 F. Supp. 1200 (E.D. Va. 1973).
52. Section 1891 provides: "All persons within the jurisdiction of the
United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to
make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the
full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons
and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like
punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind,
and to no other." 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970). Section 1892 provides: "All
citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and
Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease,
sell, hold, and convey real and personal property." Id. § 1982. Section
2000a(a)-(e) provides: "a. All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal
enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and
accommodations of any place of public accommodation, as defined in this
section, without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color,
religion, or national origin. b. Each of the following establishments which
serves the public is a place of public accommodation within the meaning
of this subchapter if its operations affect commerce, or if discrimination
or segregation by it is supported by State action: (1) any inn, hotel, motel,
or other establishment which provides lodging to transient guests, other
[Vol. III
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than an establishment located within a building which contains not more
than five rooms for rent or hire and which is actually occupied by the
proprietor of such establishment as his residence; (2) any restaurant, cafet-
eria, lunchroom, lunch counter, soda fountain, or other facility principally
engaged in selling food for consumption on the premises, including, but not
limited to, any such facility located on the premises of any retail establish-
ment; or any gasoline station; (3) any motion picture house, theater, con-
cert hall, sports arena, stadium or other place of exhibition or entertain-
ment; and (4) any establishment (A) (i) which is physically located within
the premises of any establishment otherwise covered by this subsection, or
(ii) within the premises of which is physically located any such covered
establishment, and (B) which holds itself out as serving patrons of such
covered establishment. c. The operations of an establishment affect com-
merce within the meaning of this subchapter if (1) it is one of the establish-
ments described in paragraph (1) of subsection (b) of this section; (2) in
the case of an establishment described in paragraph (2) of subsection (b)
of this section, it serves or offers to serve interstate travelers of a substan-
tial portion of the food which it serves, or gasoline or other products which
it sells, has moved in commerce; (3) in the case of an establishment de-
scribed in paragraph (3) of subsection (b) of this section, it customarily
presents films, performances, athletic teams, exhibitions, or other sources
of entertainment which move in commerce; and (4) in the case of an
establishment described in paragraph (4) of subsection (b) of this section,
it is physically located within the premises of, or there is physically located
within its premises, an establishment the operations of which affect com-
merce within the meaning of this subsection. For purposes of this section,
"commerce" means travel, trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, or
communication among the several States, or between the District of Col-
umbia and any State, or between any foreign country or any territory or
possession and any State or the District of Columbia, or between points
in the same State but through any other State or the District of Columbia
or a foreign country. d. Discrimination or segregation by an establishment
is supported by State action within the meaning of this subchapter if such
discrimination or segregation (1) is carried on under color of any law,
statute, ordinance, or regulation; or (2) is carried on under color of any
custom or usage required or enforced by officials of the State or political
subdivision thereof; or (3) is required by action of the State or political
subdivision thereof. e. The provisions of this subchapter shall not apply to
a private club or other establishment not in fact open to the public, except
to the extent that the facilities of such establishment are made available
to the customers or patrons of an establishment within the scope of subsec-
tion (b) of this section." Id. § 2000a(a)-(e). For a discussion of the interrela-
tionship of these statutes, see Note, Federal Power to Regulate Private
Discrimination: The Revival of the Enforcement Clauses of the Recon-
struction Era Amendments, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 449 (1974).
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Tillman, respondents operated a swimming pool, limiting its mem-
bership to three hundred twenty-five families. Membership prefer-
ence was given to families residing within a three-quarter mile ra-
dius. Residents within the preferred area needed no recommenda-
tion for membership and were automatically given waiting list pref-
erence if the membership was full. A selling homeowner within this
area conferred on the purchaser of his property a first option on the
vacancy created by his removal and resignation. A black couple
purchased a home within the preferred area but were discouraged
from applying for membership solely on the basis of their race. After
two members later brought a black guest to the pool, the association
changed its policy to allow only relatives as guests. The black cou-
ple, the two members, and the black guest alleged violations of
sections 1981, 1982, and 2000a. They contended that membership
constituted a type of personal property or a form of leasehold inter-
est in real property, the ownership of which could not be denied
them on racial grounds. The district court found Wheaton-Haven
to be a private club exempt from the provisions of the statutes.54 The
Supreme Court reversed, and held that the first option for member-
ship and the automatic waiting list preference may have affected
the price paid for the house so that the discrimination diluted and
abridged appellants' right to acquire a home in the area.5 Specifi-
cally:
When an organization links membership benefits to residency in a narrow
geographical area, that decision infuses those benefits into the bundle of
rights for which an individual pays when buying or leasing within the area.
The mandate of 42 U.S.C. § 1982 then operates to guarantee a nonwhite
resident, who purchases, leases, or holds this property, the same rights as
are enjoyed by a white resident.5
The Court further held that Wheaton-Haven was not a private club,
since it was open to members of the resident area. Thus, the Court
was not required to decide whether the private club exemption in
section 2000a(e)-the public accommodations provision of the Civil
53. 410 U.S. 431 (1973), rev'g 451 F.2d 1211 (4th Cir. 1971).
54. The decision is unreported but is referred to in the court's opinion.
See Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 451 F.2d 1211, 1212 (4th
Cir. 1971).
55. 410 U.S. at 437.
56. Id.
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Rights Act-was an implied limitation on the earlier section 1982. 51
Finally, the Court held that since Wheaton-Haven was not a private
club it was subject to the provisions of section 1981 (right to sue and
contract) ."s
On the unanswered question of whether the section 2000a(e) pri-
vate club exemption acts as a limitation on section 1982 it has been
suggested5" that section 1982 could be expanded, at least as to
guests, by the argument that the section protects the guest's right
to "hold" the implied easement or license which a member of a
private club wishes to grant him. Since the club is willing to admit
any white guest, it could be argued that it is not concerned with
protecting access to its facilities.
The theory of a guest having a property right under section 1982
has been upheld by the Second Circuit in Olzman v. Lake Hills
Swim Club, Inc.," a case whose facts closely parallel those of
Tillman.' The court stated:
Upon being invited by a member of the club, a black child becomes an invitee
of that member with certain rights pursuant thereto. Whether these rights
are denominated licenses, easements or usufructs, the guest has an interest
in his guest status which the law may protect from certain invasions."
The court also found that under section 1981, when the guest pays
a guest fee, a contract arises either between the guest and the club
or between the member and the club, to which the guest is a third
party beneficiary able to enforce the contract. 3 To prevent the mak-
ing of such contracts is a violation of section 1981.11
Proceeding to discuss section 2000a, the court held that the club
was a place of public accommodation, not a private club under
section 2000a(e).5 That the club affected interstate commerce was
57. Id. at 438-39. Section 1981 was derived from the Civil Rights Act
of 1870, and section 2000 from Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
58. 410 U.S. at 439-40.
59. Note, Federal Power to Regulate Private Discrimination: The Re-
vival of the Enforcement Clauses of the Reconstruction Era Amendments,
74 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 493-94 (1974).
60. 495 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1974).
61. Id. at 1336.
62. Id. at 1339 (citation omitted).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1340.
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indicated because it served club luncheons, maintained a snackbar,
and had club movie nights, all of which involve goods traveling in
interstate commerce. Citing Katzenbach v. McClung,66 the court
stated that although the effect upon interstate commerce may be
miniscule, the aggregate effect of such discrimination by all clubs,
pools, and snackbars was sufficient to make the statute applicable.67
Thus, Olzman strikes the death knell of private club racial discrimi-
nation by invalidating it under both the Civil Rights Act and the
commerce clause.
Most of the cases dealing with private club discrimination have
dealt with sections 1981 and 1982;18 however, section 198369 may also
serve as a basis for challenging racial discrimination. An example
is a case decided by the Fifth Circuit, Adams v. Miami Police Be-
nevolent Association,"0 where black police officers were excluded
from membership in a police benevolent association solely on ac-
count of race. The court held that notwithstanding the existence of
another benevolent association comprised of black officers perform-
ing similar functions and reaping similar benefits, the white officers'
association, larger and stronger than its companion group, was so
entwined with the city police department that its refusal to admit
blacks was action under color of state law in violation of section 1983
and the fourteenth amendment.7'
The Civil Rights Act, then, is a useful mechanism for invalidating
racially discriminatory membership practices where the club ad-
mits residents of a geographic area (Tillman) or where it acts Under
66. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
67. 495 F.2d at 1340.
68. This is so because the first two sections are of broad application,
applying to all contractual and property rights, while the third section
applies only to actions done under color of law. For the text of the sections,
see notes 52 supra and 69 infra.
69. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides: "Every person who, under color
of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or
Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress."
70. 454 F.2d 1315 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 843 (1972).
71. Id. at 1318-19.
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color of state law (Adams). Where the club opens its doors to guests,
providing services which either involve goods travelling in interstate
commerce or which are performed under color of state law
(Olzman), racially discriminatory guest practices may be invalida-
ted. Since the Act makes no mention of sex discrimination, its effec-
tiveness does not extend to such cases.
D. State Statutes
As previously mentioned, the federal statutes have proven to be
a powerful weapon against racial discrimination."
To assure that other forms of discrimination do not remain out-
side the law's reach, some states have utilized their police power to
draft additional antidiscrimination laws. Of particular note are the
provisions of the Washington," New York, 4 and Pennsylvania"
statutes. In addition to race, creed, and color, these laws prohibit
discrimination on account of national origin, ancestry, age, and sex.
All contain an exemption for clubs which are truly private, but
stipulate that if a club opens its doors to the public for a limited
purpose, it is deemed to be a place of public accommodation and
may not discriminate.7 6
The two major cases dealing with these laws are Commonwealth
Human Relations Commission v. Moose Lodge No. 1777 and
Batavia Lodge No. 196 v. Division of Human Rights. 8 The former
case, which was the final disposition of Moose Lodge, concerned the
lodge's violations of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act." The
question before the court was whether the public accommodations
72. See text accompanying notes 46-51 supra.
73. Law Against Discrimination, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 49.60.010-
.320 (1962), asamended, (Supp. 1974).
74. Human Rights Law, N.Y. ExEc. LAW §§ 290-301 (McKinney 1972),
as amended, (McKinney Supp. 1974).
75. Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 951-
63 (1964), as amended, (Supp. 1974). For an evaluation of the Pennsyl-
vania Human Relations Commission's effectiveness in regulating discrimi-
nation in all contexts, see Comment, Survey: the Pennsylvania Human
Relations Commission, 77 DICK. L. REv. 522 (1973).
76. See cases cited note 20 supra.
77. 448 Pa. 451, 294 A.2d 594, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1052 (1972).
78. 35 N.Y.2d 143, 316 N.E.2d 318, 359 N.Y.S.2d 25 (1974).
79. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 951-59 (1964), as amended, (Supp. 1974).
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section of the act"° was applicable to Moose Lodge's dining and bar
facilities where guests of members were admitted. Exempted from
the section barring discrimination in public accommodations were
"any accommodations which are in their nature distinctly pri-
vate."8' The court found that the club was not "distinctly private"
because its facilities were open to guests. Any discrimination in such
facilities was clearly contrary to state law.82
The statute proved a successful vehicle for eliminating discrimi-
80. Section 955 provides that it shall be an unlawful discriminatory
practice, unless based upon membership in the case of a fraternal associa-
tion: "(i) For any person being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager,
superintendent, agent or employe of any place of public accommodation,
resort or amusement to (1) Refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person
because of his race, color, religious creed, ancestry or national origin, or to
any person due to use of a guide dog because of the blindness of the user,
either directly or indirectly, any of the accommodations, advantages, facil-
ities or privileges of such place of public accommodation, resort or amuse-
ment. (2) Publish, circulate, issue, display, post or mail, either directly or
indirectly, any written or printed communication, notice or advertisement
to the effect that any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and
privileges of any such place shall be refused, withheld from or denied to
any person on account of race, color, religious creed, ancestry or national
origin, or to any person due to use of a guide dog because of the blindness
of the user, or that the patronage or custom thereat of any person, belong-
ing to or purporting to be of any particular race, color, religious creed,
ancestry or national origin, or to any person due to use of a guide dog
because of the blindness of the user, is unwelcome, objectionable or not
acceptable, desired or solicited. Nothing in clause (h) of this section shall
bar any religious or denominational institution or organization or any char-
itable or educational organization, which is operated, supervised or con-
trolled by or in connection with a religious organization or any bona fide
private or fraternal organization from giving preference to persons of the
same religion or denomination or to members of such private or fraternal
organization or from making such selection as is calculated by such organi-
zation to promote the religious principles or the aims, purposes or fraternal
principles for which it is established or maintained. Nor shall it apply to
the rental of rooms or apartments in a landlord occupied rooming house
with a common entrance." Id. § 955. The reader should note that subdivi-
sion (i) does not contain a reference to sex. Every other subdivision of the
section includes sex as an impermissible basis of discrimination.
81. Id. § 954(1).
82. 448 Pa. at 460, 294 A.2d at 598.
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nation, at least as to guests. While the Supreme Court was reluctant
to find state action, the Pennsylvania law provided a workable alter-
native.
Batavia Lodge likewise involved the discriminatory activities of
a Moose Lodge. The club invited blacks to a fashion show on its
premises. They were refused service at the bar and were verbally
abused. Under the New York law, the Commissioner of Human
Rights found sufficient evidence to warrant the imposition of com-
pensatory damages for each complainant. 3 The court upheld the
award because of "[tihe extremely strong statutory policy of elimi-
nating discrimination .... "I'
Both cases invalidated discrimination against black guests. At
least one state, however, has decided that a private club is not a
place of public accommodation and thus may discriminate both as
to its members and as to their guests.85 The Oklahoma law, in com-
parison with the New York and Washington laws,8" also fails to in-
clude sex as a basis for finding discriminatory practice in public
accommodations. 7
In a recent Oklahoma case, Oklahoma Human Rights Commis-
sion v. Hotie, Inc. ,88 an interesting question arose as to the interrela-
tion between municipal licensing regulations and the state antidis-
crimination law. Oklahoma City had licensed the Onyx Club as a
private club for purposes of regulation. The club contended that
since it was licensed as private it could not possibly be a place of
public accommodation under the state law. Reversing the lower
83. 35 N.Y.2d at 145, 316 N.E.2d at 319, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 26.
84. Id. at 146, 316 N.E.2d at 320, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 27.
85. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 25, § 1401(1)(i) (Supp. 1974), which provides
that "a private club is not a place of public accommodation, if its policies
are determined by its members and its facilities or services are available
only to its members and their bona fide guests . .. ."
86. The New York law includes sex as a basis of discrimination in
public accommodations but expressly states that such discrimination is
permissible where there are bona fide considerations of public policy. N.Y.
EXEC. LAW § 296(2) (McKinney 1972), as amended, (McKinney Supp.
1974). The Washington law simply declares that there is a right to be free
from discrimination on the basis of sex in places of public accommodation.
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.030(1)(6) (1962), as amended, (Supp. 1974).
87. OKLA. STAT. tit. 25, §1402 (Supp. 1974).
88. 505 P.2d 1320 (Okla. 1973).
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court's summary judgment for the club, the appeals court stated
that the city's determination, made to regulate clubs, did not neces-
sarily preclude a finding that the club was a place of public accom-
modation under state law.89
The "public accommodation" theory has been used in numerous
contexts to proscribe otherwise private discrimination. 0 The courts
tend to construe the term broadly so as to further state policy of
eradicating discrimination.9 New Jersey has even included Little
League, Inc. as a public accommodation. National Organization for
Women v. Little League, Inc.,92 involved the typical athletics con-
troversy; girls of eight to twelve years of age were prohibited from
playing baseball with boys of the same ages. Little League argued
that the girls were more susceptible than their male counterparts to
injury. 3 Plaintiffs maintained that the league could not discrimi-
nate against girls by reason of the state's Law Against Discrimina-
tion.94 The court concluded from the evidence presented that girls
of this age were not as a class subject to greater hazard of injury than
boys of the same age.9 It held that Little League was an "accommo-
dation" which was "public" by virtue of its open admission to all
male children in the community. The "place" of public accommo-
dation was the ball field. 7 The court stated:
The law is remedial and should be read with an approach sympathetic to its
objectives. . . . If this organization were not deemed a place of public ac-
89. Id. at 1324.
90. See, e.g., notes 80-87 supra and accompanying text.
91. See Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Lysyj, 38 Ohio St. 2d 217, 313
N.E.2d 3 (1974).
92. 127 N.J. Super. 522, 318 A.2d 33 (App. Div. 1974).
93. Little League, perhaps in anticipation of the disfavor with which
the court would greet its "physical difference" argument, also argued that
bodily privacy was involved at Little League games. The court caustically
rejected this line of argument, stating: "The suggestion that such a hazard
[of breach of bodily privacy] is presented when a male coach gives first
aid to an injured girl player appears to border on the frivolous." Id. at 533,
318 A.2d at 38.
94. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12(f) (Supp. 1974).
95. 127 N.J. Super. at 529, 318 A.2d at 36-37.
96. Id. at 531, 318 A.2d at 37-38.
97. Id. at 530, 318 A.2d at 37.
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commodation it would be free to discriminate on the basis of race or religion
as well as sex.98
Since the state laws which often provide for the invalidation of
sex discrimination are construed liberally, the state courts are the
best forum for any challenges in this area. They are likewise effec-
tive, as is the Civil Rights Act, for dealing with racial discrimination
in private clubs.
E. Tax Exemptions
The tax power of both state and federal government is yet another
way to combat discrimination. The Supreme Court recently decided
in Bob Jones University v. Simon9 that the Internal Revenue Serv-
ice may not be enjoined from revoking its ruling letter declaring
petitioner school qualified for tax exempt status, or from withdraw-
ing assurance to donors that contributions would be deductible, in
light of the IRS decision to deny tax-exempt status for private
schools maintaining racially discriminatory admissions policies. 0
Bob Jones University is devoted to teaching fundamentalist reli-
gious beliefs which include the tenet that God intended segregation
of the races. Accordingly, the university refused to admit blacks.
The Court rejected petitioner's contention that the IRS was at-
tempting solely to regulate the admissions policies of private uni-
versities, stating that there was no evidence that the IRS position
was not a good faith effort to enforce the tax laws.' 0'
This theory was successfully applied to private clubs in
Falkenstein v. Department of Revenue. 02 In that case, a black was
denied membership in the Elks Lodge solely because of his race. He
successfully sought to restrain the state from granting tax exemp-
tions to the discriminatory fraternal organization. The court found
state action, which was lacking in Moose Lodge, because the state
98. Id. (citations omitted).
99. 416 U.S. 725 (1974).
100. Tax-exempt status for private schools is provided for in INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954, § 501(c)(3). In 1970, the Internal Revenue Service an-
nounced that it would no longer allow tax exempt status under section
501(c)(3) for racially discriminatory schools. See Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2
CUM. BULL. 230.
101. 416 U.S. at 740.
102. 350 F. Supp. 887 (D. Ore. 1972), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1099
(1973).
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relieved the organization from property and corporate excise taxes
while the public benefited from the charitable and benevolent activ-
ities of the organization. 10 3 The discriminatory practice therefore
violated the equal protection clause and the court enjoined the
granting of a tax exemption. 0
III. Conclusion
Discriminatory private clubs are no longer assured of continued
governmental support and protection. Courts and legislatures have
increasingly moved to discourage private racial and sex discrimina-
tion by deeming organizations public places, by removing tax bene-
fits, by finding impermissible state action, and by regulating inter-
state commerce.
It is often said that for government to tread in private areas is
dangerous precedent.'"' But in our society, clubs play an enormous
role both in recreational and economic activities. There is no ques-
tion but that status attaches to membership in private clubs. A
glance at the biographical campaign literature of a "local" candi-
date for public office frequently reveals a string citation'of organiza-
tions to which he belongs. It is also generally conceded that business
103. Id. at 888-89.
104. Id. Falkenstein has been relied on in Brunson v. Rutherford Lodge
No. 547, 128 N.J. Super. 66, 319 A.2d 80 (1974) where it was held that the
granting of tax exemptions to the discriminatory Elks Lodge was imper-
missible state action. The court stated: "The involvement of the State in
the granting of a tax exemption of the type involved here is far different
from that in granting liquor licenses. In this State it has long been recog-
nized that there is a symbiotic relationship between the State and the
exempt organization and that the latter is relieved from the burden of
taxation because it is practically performing a public work which the State
would otherwise have to perform." 128 N.J. Super. at 85-86, 319 A.2d at
91.
105. This belief is rooted in the notions of right of privacy and associa-
tion. There are certain areas of private life in which the government ought
not to interfere. See note 2 supra and accompanying text. See also Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965); NAACP v. Alabama, 377
U.S. 288, 307 (1958) (regulation may not be so broad as to invade the area
of protected freedoms); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)
(fourth and fifth amendments protect against governmental invasions "of
the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life").
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decisions are routinely made in clubs'"6 which provide a relaxed,
informal atmosphere in which to discuss business. To preclude
groups from membership in such organizations may effectively in-
hibit the business success of the group as a whole. Accordingly, it
is of the utmost importance that racial, sex, and certain other forms
of discrimination be lessened as much as possible, and confined to
those few instances where associational rights prevail." 7
For the courts to pursue such a goal, the legislatures must give
them the necessary tools. The continued and expanding use of ad-
ministrative procedures for the alleviation of discrimination is like-
wise essential. For an injured party to bring suit is costly and bur-
densome. Consumer frauds are routinely investigated on the basis
of complaint letters by city agencies and attorneys general. There
is no reason why discrimination complaints should not be similarly
treated and wholeheartedly encouraged by public officials. Govern-
mental support of such "suspect class" discrimination should be
curtailed so that nothing but the ordinary services, such as fire
protection, water, and electricity are given by the government to
discriminatory entities. It is only where sincere efforts are made by
all branches of government that such discrimination can be elimi-
nated.
Tina L. Weliner
106. See Cook, Newark Elite Dine in Style in Private Clubs, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 26, 1973, at 43, cols. 5-8.
107. See note 2 supra.
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